01The Claim and the Line
The legal and historical record of the McMahon Line, the 1962 war, and the contest over maps, names and memory. What is settled, what is contested, and what can be verified on the ground.
New Delhi · 1–2 February 2027
A two-day Track-II convening on the Arunachal Pradesh dispute, the character of Chinese pressure, the global cost of a China–India conflict, and the terms of a durable stability.
01 The moment
Sovereignty, Stability and the Eastern Himalaya
The Line of Actual Control is a disputed frontier of about 3,400 km between two nuclear-armed states. Since 2020 it has stopped being a background condition and become an active instrument of pressure.
Arunachal Pradesh sits at the centre of that change. China claims the entire state and has never accepted the McMahon Line; India administers it as an integral part of the Union. The dispute is old. What is new is the scale of infrastructure, the pace of administrative change, and the use of trade, technology and water as instruments of pressure — with intent stated in some cases and inferred in others.
The Uttara Dialogue exists to examine that shift without exaggeration. It is designed to bring legal scholars, defence analysts, economists and diplomats into one room for two days, to test India's position against its strongest critics, and to ask what a stable outcome would actually require.
Sovereignty is not a bargaining chip. Stability is not a concession.
Conference framing — not a quotation from any government
02Themes
The programme moves from the legal record, through the instruments of pressure and their global consequences, to the mechanisms that could produce stability.
The legal and historical record of the McMahon Line, the 1962 war, and the contest over maps, names and memory. What is settled, what is contested, and what can be verified on the ground.
How pressure is applied short of war, what it does to the frontier and the wider Himalayan arc, and where deterrence holds or fails.
Why a Himalayan border dispute is now a global economic and strategic event: trade dependence, critical minerals, shipping, energy and the forums that are meant to manage it.
Verification, confidence-building, de-risking and the diplomacy that could make escalation irrational. What missions, think tanks and governments can realistically do next.
03Programme
Ten sessions and two discussion forums. Times are indicative until the venue is confirmed. Each session brief states what is documented, what is credibly reported, what is contested and what is rumoured. The forums are held under the Chatham House Rule.
1–2 February 2027 · New Delhi
Framing
The opening plenary sets the terms of the two days: why a boundary dispute in one Indian state has become a test of the regional order, what this conference treats as documented, credibly reported, contested or rumoured, and what remains genuinely open. It frames the four themes and the questions the closing session must answer.
A senior Indian strategic-affairs voice with direct China policy experience, paired with an international chair.
The Claim and the Line
The legal foundations of the dispute, examined without slogans: the 1914 Simla Convention, which China initialled but did not sign, the McMahon Line, China's grounds for rejecting both, the 1962 war and its aftermath, and the contemporary politics of renaming. The session separates what the record establishes from what international law leaves open.
An international lawyer, a historian of modern China, and a Chinese-reading discussant.
The Claim and the Line
What can actually be verified along the frontier: road and village construction, dual-use infrastructure, patrol patterns, and the disputed geography of the Line of Actual Control. The session separates what commercial imagery can show from what is reported, contested or rumoured, and asks what monitoring would need to look like.
A remote-sensing or defence-geography specialist, a retired frontier commander, and a journalist with field experience.
Pressure and Consequence
Arunachal is one segment of a wider arc. This session examines Tibet's status and its use in boundary claims, the Doklam standoff and the Sikkim sector, and the eastern arc that runs from those precedents to Arunachal. It asks how events at one point shape expectations at another, without assuming that pressure moves mechanically along the frontier.
A Himalayan specialist, a China–India border scholar, and a Tibetan affairs analyst.
Pressure and Consequence
A moderated, off-record forum on the hardest question: what is negotiable, what is not, and whether any formula can reconcile sovereignty with stability. Participation is limited to invited delegates; no attributions without consent.
A senior retired diplomat as chair; no formal panellists.
The Wider War
Economic pressure is cheaper than military pressure and harder to attribute. This session maps India's dependence on Chinese rare-earth magnets and processed critical minerals, active pharmaceutical ingredients, electronics and machinery, reviews the use of export controls as statecraft, and asks how far de-risking can go without a self-defeating decoupling.
A trade economist, a supply-chain specialist, and an industry representative.
The Wider War
A China–India conflict would not stay bilateral in its economic effects. This session traces how a Himalayan war becomes a global price shock through shipping, insurance, energy, semiconductors and critical minerals, and asks which economies would be hit first and hardest.
A macroeconomist, a shipping or insurance analyst, and an energy-security researcher.
The Wider War
India sits in forums that include China and forums that do not. This session assesses what each can actually deliver on a sovereignty dispute, why most Global South states have no public position on Arunachal, and whether coalition-building can change Beijing's calculus without turning the dispute into a bloc confrontation.
A multilateral practitioner, a Global South scholar, and a regional-security analyst.
Pressure and Consequence
The conventional balance, India's infrastructure and procurement, the role of partners, and the nuclear threshold that disciplines everything. The session works up an escalation ladder and asks which rungs are stable, which are not, and what signals would keep a crisis below the top.
A defence analyst, a nuclear-strategy scholar, and a former service officer.
The Way Out
A practical session for the institutions in the room. What diplomatic missions and Track-II institutions have actually contributed, where their record is thin, how evidence travels between capitals, and where quiet coordination is more useful than public statements.
Two heads of mission or senior diplomats and a think-tank director.
The Way Out
A working forum on mechanisms: verification, buffer zones, hotlines, incident-prevention protocols and sequencing. The aim is not a treaty but a set of arrangements that make accidental escalation less likely and intentional escalation more costly.
A retired ambassador as chair, with technical and military advisers in the room.
The Way Out
The closing session presents the conference report and tests its recommendations against the room. It identifies what can be done in one year, what requires the full eight years to 2034, and what must be left to governments.
The conference chair and the lead author.
04 The Report
Version 1.0
Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese pressure, and the global consequences of a China–India conflict
The conference report sets out the legal and historical record of the Arunachal Pradesh dispute, states India's position and China's position in their own terms, documents the instruments of pressure used since 2020, grading each as documented, reported or contested, and estimates the economic consequences of a wider conflict. It closes with scenarios for 2027–2032 and a sequenced eight-year agenda to 2034 covering verification, confidence-building, deterrence and economic resilience. Every factual claim is attributed to a dated source, and single-source claims are flagged; contested claims are labelled as claims.
05Participation
Attendance is by invitation and capped at 120–150 participants. The mix is deliberate: missions, researchers, lawyers, defence analysts, economists and a small number of journalists.
120–150 invited participants
Ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission and political counsellors accredited to New Delhi, together with visiting China and Indo-Pacific desks where nominations permit.
By letter to the mission. Each mission may nominate up to three participants.
Institutions working on China, the Himalaya, Indo-Pacific security, trade and supply chains, in India and abroad.
By letter to the head of institution, with a request to nominate one senior researcher and one early-career researcher.
International lawyers, historians, geographers and economists with published work on the dispute or its consequences.
By individual invitation following a proposal or nomination.
Firms and associations with exposure to critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, electronics, energy and shipping.
By invitation to a limited number of chief economists and supply-chain leads.
Invited journalists covering diplomacy, defence and the economy. Selected sessions are on the record; forums are not.
By invitation. Recording is permitted only where the chair states that a session is on the record.
06Speakers
The roster is built session by session, against the question each session has to answer. Proposals are open now; no participation is confirmed until a formal letter of invitation has been issued.
Tell us who should be in the room, or put yourself forward. Proposals are reviewed by the secretariat and the session chairs.
The speaker roster will be announced on a dated schedule to be published by the secretariat. The secretariat is inviting proposals from scholars, practitioners and officials speaking in a personal capacity. No participation is confirmed until a formal letter of invitation has been issued.
Submit a speaker proposalWe read every proposal. Because the programme is curated, we cannot accept all of them, and we do not provide feedback on individual submissions.
07Venue
A single-track plenary format. The venue will be announced with the first invitation round; access and travel guidance will be published at the same time.
In-person, by invitation
New DelhiIndia
To be announced
Version 1.0The Uttara Dialogue will be held in New Delhi in a single-track plenary format. The venue will be announced with the first invitation round; access and travel guidance will be published at the same time.
08Questions
Practical answers for missions, institutions and individuals considering a proposal.
A two-day Track-II convening on the dispute over Arunachal Pradesh, the character of Chinese pressure toward India, the global consequences of a China–India conflict, and the terms of a durable stability. It is built around a published report, released in Version 1.0 at the event, and a curated programme of ten sessions and two discussion forums.
An independent conference secretariat based in New Delhi. The Uttara Dialogue is not a government event and does not carry the name, crest or authority of any government, ministry, consulate or parent organisation. Institutional partners, if any, will be listed only after written agreement.
Attendance is by invitation and is limited to 120–150 participants: diplomatic missions, think tanks, academia, a small number of industry representatives, and invited journalists. The speaker proposal form is open, but submitting a proposal does not register you for the event.
Yes. Use the proposal form on this site. Include a session preference, a proposed title, a short abstract, a biography and a résumé. Proposals are reviewed by the secretariat and the session chairs. Serving officials should confirm that they may participate in a personal capacity.
No. There is no fee to attend or to propose a speaker. Participants cover their own travel and accommodation. The secretariat does not arrange visas, though it can issue a letter confirming an invitation once participation is confirmed.
Plenaries and panels are on the record unless the chair says otherwise. Both discussion forums are held under the Chatham House Rule, and the only published output from the forums is the chair's summary, with no attribution without consent. Recording is permitted only where the chair states that a session is on the record.
Every factual claim is attributed to a dated source; single-source claims are flagged. Where sources disagree, the disagreement is shown. Contested claims are labelled as claims by the party making them, not presented as established fact. The report's bibliography is published with it.
All participants will be bound by a code of conduct, published with the confirmation pack. It will require courtesy in debate, respect for the Chatham House Rule in the two discussion forums, and consent before any remark is attributed to a speaker or institution. Concerns may be raised in confidence with the secretariat.
Press participation is by invitation. Journalists covering diplomacy, defence and the economy may write to the secretariat with their details and their accreditation status; the secretariat will confirm whether a place is available and the terms of coverage. Recording is permitted only where the chair states that a session is on the record. The forums are not for attribution.
It is used only to assess your proposal. Résumés are stored outside the public web directory with randomised filenames and are available only to the secretariat. Unsuccessful applications are deleted after twelve months. We do not sell data, run third-party analytics, or share your details with other institutions. You can request deletion by writing to the secretariat.
The venue will be announced with the first invitation round. The secretariat will publish an access statement at the same time and will accommodate specific requirements on request. Write to the secretariat before the event.
No. The Uttara Dialogue is an in-person convening. Selected plenary and panel material will be published after the event, and the report will be freely available online.
09 Speaker proposals
Tell us who should be in the room, or put yourself forward. The secretariat reads every proposal with the session chairs, and aims to reply within ten working days.
We read every proposal. Because the programme is curated, we cannot accept all of them, and we do not provide feedback on individual submissions.
The secretariat aims to reply to proposals within ten working days. Please do not send classified or sensitive material through this website.
We collect only what is needed to assess a speaker proposal: your name, contact details, institution, proposal and résumé. We do not sell data, do not use third-party analytics, and delete unsuccessful applications after twelve months.
Data retained for 12 months. Notice updated 2026-11-03.
10 Secretariat
For invitations, proposals, accessibility requirements and press enquiries, write to the secretariat.
The secretariat aims to reply to proposals within ten working days. Please do not send classified or sensitive material through this website.